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Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game
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Detecting defection and alarming partners about the possible danger could be essential to avoid being ex-
ploited. This act, however, may require a huge individual effort from those who take this job, hence such
strategy seems to be unfavorable. But structured populations can provide an opportunity where largely un-
selfish excluder strategy can form an effective alliance with other cooperative strategies hence they can sweep
out defection. Interestingly, this alliance is functioning even at extremely large cost of exclusion where the
sole application of exclusion strategy would be harmful otherwise. These results may explain why the emer-
gence of extreme selfless behavior is not necessarily against individual selection, but could be the result of an
evolutionary process.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
It is always disappointing to realize exploitation by oth-
ers in a joint venture where participants decide independently
whether to contribute to a common pool. The core of social
dilemmas origins from the fact that players in general have
no preliminary information about how partners will behave
[1–3]. This problem can be addressed in several ways, like
by recording previous acts via a reputation-like tag, by mon-
itoring and rewarding cooperators or punishing defector who
become less successful in this way [4–22]. But every kind
of approach requires an additional individual effort from the
player who pays extra attention to check others. This possibil-
ity transforms the dilemma onto a new level, where the ques-
tion is who bears the extra cost of monitoring and punishing
defection [23–25]? Interestingly, this so-called second-order
free-riders dilemmamay be solved automatically in structured
populations where players have limited number and practi-
cally stable links which allow punishing players to separate
from pure cooperators who can be considered as second-order
free riders [26]. When these strategies form isolated groups
in the sea of defectors then the advantage of punishing strat-
egy reveals and pure cooperators diminish, which results in a
higher average cooperator level.
Punishing others, however, is not necessarily an attractive
strategy for every cooperator and the application of punish-
ment will reduce the average payoff in the population [27, 28].
An alternative way to avoid being exploited is if a player mon-
itors defection and alarm all other cooperator players in the
group about the possible danger. The mentioned player hence
can exclude defectors from the joint venture for the benefit
of all others. Some previous works have already studied the
possible positive effect of social exclusion in well-mixed pop-
ulations [29–32], but its consequences in structured popula-
tions remained unexplored. The goal of our present work is
to reveal how exclusion strategy may influence the evolution
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of cooperation in a system where network reciprocity already
establishes a supporting environment for cooperation.
For this reason we extend a previously studied model where
beside pure cooperators punishing players also compete with
defectors for space in a structured population [33]. In our
present model we add a new strategy, which is called as ex-
cluder, who undertakes the extra effort of monitoring and ex-
cluding defectors from the joint venture. Our principal goal
is to identify the limit of excluder’s cost until this strategy is
able to survive and serves the community. We will show that
the most effective way to fight against defection is when ex-
clusion strategy forms a defensive alliance with other cooper-
ative strategies and they support each other mutually to sweep
out defectors. First, however, we proceed with presenting the
details of the extended spatial model.
II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME WITH EXCLUSION
We study an evolutionary public goods game (PGG) on the
square lattice where players can choose from four different
strategies. The competing strategies are D defectors who do
not contribute to the common pool, but only enjoy its posi-
tive consequence, C cooperators who contributes c = 1 to
the joint venture, but do not bear the extra cost of punish-
ment or exclusion, P punishers who do not only contribute to
the pool, but also punish defectors at the expense of an extra
cost, and finally E excluders who beside contributing to the
pool also monitor defectors in the group and alarm all other
group members about the possible danger. Due to this alarm-
ing a defector will be excluded from the common game and
returns empty handed, while other group members can enjoy
the benefit of common acts. Perhaps it is worth noting that
social exclusion maintains only if E players are present in the
groups, otherwise, when they are absent, defector player can
exploit group efforts again. Evidently, monitoring and alarm-
ing others require an extra effort from an E player which is
considered via an extra cost. We should also stress that the
cost of punishment and social exclusion should not necessar-
ily be equal, hence we can study the specific cases when an
excluder may bear an extremely high cost.
2Denoting the number of cooperators, defectors, punishers,
and excluders among neighbors in the group byND, NC , NP ,
and NE respectively, the payoff of the focal player is:
ΠD = δ(NE)
r(NC +NP )
G
− β
NP
G− 1
(1)
ΠC = δ(NE)
r(nC +NP + 1)
G
+ (1− δ(NE))r − 1 (2)
ΠP = ΠC − γ
ND
G− 1
(3)
ΠE = r − 1− ǫ
ND
G− 1
, (4)
where the Kronecker-delta function is δ(x) = 1 if x = 0,
otherwise δ(x) = 0. By using this delta function we can
handle the situation when a defector player cannot gain any-
thing from the group venture due to the presence of an ex-
cluder. The other parameters are idential to those we used in
a simplified model [33]. Namely, r denotes the synergy fac-
tor, β is the maximum value of fine of a defector when it is
surrounded by punisher players exclusively. Parameter γ de-
notes the maximum value of punishment cost that should bear
by a punisher when it forms a group with four other defec-
tors. Last, ǫ describes the additional cost of exclusion strat-
egy which should always be considered in the presence of de-
fectors. Equation (4) indicates that our model considers peer
exclusion. Consequently, a player who considers exclusion
strategy pays an extra cost that is proportional to the num-
ber of defectors in the group. It also means that an E player
should not bear this cost in the absence of defectors. An alter-
native way to include social exclusion would be the so-called
pool exclusion when E strategy has to pay a fixed, but per-
manent extra cost independently of how many defectors are in
the group.
In the simplest case of a structured population the players
are arranged on a square lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions where L2 players are assigned to overlapping groups of
size G = 5 such that everyone is connected to its G − 1 = 4
nearest neighbours [34]. Accordingly, each individual i be-
longs to g = 1, . . . , G different groups and the total payoff
is the sum of all the payoffs Πi acquired in each individual
group. We should stress, however, that our most important
observations are robust and remain valid if we apply other in-
teraction topologies, as it will be illustrated in the next sec-
tion. The only essential criterion is to have limited number of
neighbors who are fixed, at least for reasonable time of inter-
action comparing to the strategy update timescale [35–38].
To model the selection process during the evolution we ap-
ply an imitation dynamics [39, 40]. More precisely, during an
elementary Monte Carlo step we select a player x and one of
its neighbor y randomly. The total payoff Πsy and Πsx are
calculated for both players. After player y adopts the strategy
from player x with a probability given by the Fermi function
w(sx → sy) = 1/{1+exp[(Πsy−Πsx)/K]}, whereK = 0.5
quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [41]. This for-
mula helps to avoid trapped artificial states [42] and ensures
that better performing players are readily adopted, although it
is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player performing
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FIG. 1: (color online) Fraction of surviving strategies in dependence
of the cost of exclusion at r = 3.8, β = 0.2, and γ = 0.6. The high
cost of punishment prevents strategy P to survive and the remain-
ing three strategies coexist in an intermediate interval of exclusion
cost. If ǫ is too high then we get back the outcome of the classic
two-strategy model where D and C coexist for high synergy factor
values. Below a threshold value of ǫ, marked by an arrow, defec-
tors die out and the system terminates into a defector-free state. To
avoid accidental die out of strategies due to fluctuation and to obtain
the proper stationary values of cyclically dominating strategies we
needed to use large system sizes (at least L = 1200 and 1600).
worse. Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives every player
a chance to change its strategy once on average.
Note that in the absence of exclusion our model becomes
equivalent with the previously studied PGG model with peer-
punishment [26, 33, 43]. It is also worth stressing that the
relations ofC,P , andE strategies are neutral in the absence of
defectors because neither P norE has to bear an extra cost. In
the latter case the trajectory of evolution becomes equivalent
to a voter-model-like dynamics [44–46].
III. RESULTS
Previous studies in structured populations explored that the
value of synergy factor could divide the parameter space into
two significantly different regions [5, 26, 33]. More precisely,
if synergy factor is large enough then network reciprocity
alone is capable to maintain cooperation and cooperators co-
exist with defectors. (This critical value is r ≈ 3.744 for
square lattice at K = 0.5 [41, 47].) In the latter case, when
network reciprocity is functioning, the final outcome depends
practically on the cost of punishing strategy. If the cost of
punishment is moderate then punishing players can crowed
out pure cooperators via an indirect territorial competition be-
cause the former strategy is more effective against defectors
[26]. In the opposite case, when the cost of punishment is
too large then we get back the outcome of the simplified two-
strategy model where pure cooperators can coexist with de-
fectors because C players form compact islands in the sea of
defectors and support each other mutually. The other concep-
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FIG. 2: (color online) Fixation probability to full-E state at r = 3.8
in dependence of cost of exclusion in the two-strategy (D − E)
model. The alternative outcome of evolution is always the full-D
state, hence the plotted probability determines how likely defection
dies out. This quantity shows a serious finite-size effect (linear sizes
of systems are denoted by the legend). Furthermore, the character of
initial state will also determine the speed of convergence to the large-
size limit. In particular, symbols with dashed lines show the results
when system was launched from a random initial state, while sym-
bols with solid lines denote the results when evolution was launched
from a patch-like pattern. Simulations were averaged over 10000
independent runs for small sizes, while 100 runs were used for the
largest system sizes.
tually different parameter region is when the synergy factor r
is too low and network reciprocity cannot really help to main-
tain cooperation. In the latter case neither C nor P strategy is
able to coexist with defectors. As a result, D prevails, or be-
comes extinct only if the punishment fine β is large enough.
The critical threshold of β depends on the cost of punishment,
as it is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) in Ref. [26].
Based on these observations we can distinguish three con-
ceptually different parameter regions where qualitatively dif-
ferent behaviors are expected if we add a new E strategy of
social exclusion. In the following we will focus on these three
parameter regions and clarify whether the presence ofE strat-
egy will change the evolutionary outcome.
A. Behaviors in the high r – high γ region
We first start our presentation with the high synergy fac-
tor – high punishment cost region where the simplified model
would predict the coexistence of C +D strategies. Note that
by adding strategy E into the system the number of parame-
ters is also increased. Therefore, for a more complete view, we
present the evolutionary outcomes in dependence of the exclu-
sion cost ǫ for a representative value of γ. Figure 1 shows that
excluders die out if the cost of exclusion is too high and co-
operators and defectors coexist as in the classic two-strategy
model. By decreasing ǫ, however, we can observe a stable
coexistence of D,C, and E strategies, where the fraction of
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FIG. 3: (color online) Curvature dependence of critical cost of ex-
clusion when E competes with D at r = 3.8. Initially E players,
marked by blue (dark grey), are arranged into a circle-shape island
with radius R in the sea of defectors, marked by red (light grey). If
ǫ < ǫc the island grows, otherwise shrinks. This behavior shows a
sharp change at a fixed R. The border values of this change were
determined from 100 independent runs for each R value.
defectors decreases gradually with ǫ. This kind of solution is
a characteristic behavior in structured populations and it can-
not be observed in well-mixed populations [29, 30]. Below a
threshold value of ǫ, marked by an arrow in the plot, defec-
tors die out and only cooperator strategies remain. As already
noted, after the extinction of the last defector a neutral drift
starts among the surviving cooperating strategies in agreement
with Eqs. (2-4).
We would like to emphasize that the value of critical cost of
exclusion ǫc = 9.442 is extremely high. It means that defector
behavior can be crowded out totally from the population by
means of exclusion strategy even if the latter players have to
bear such an irrationally high extra cost.
To evaluate this threshold value properly we now consider
a simplified model in which onlyD and E strategies compete
for space. In the latter case the system will always terminate
into a full-E or a full-D state. Interestingly, this evolution
is stochastic and both destinations can be observed by using
identical parameter values. This serious finite-size effect is
demonstrated in Fig. 2 where we plotted the probability to
terminates to the full-E state (or alternatively, the probabil-
ity of strategy D becomes extinct is shown) in dependence of
exclusion cost for different system sizes. Beside the random
initial state we have also used a so-called patch-like initial
state where competing strategies are forming homogeneous
domains from the beginning. (For clarity, an illustration of a
prepared, patch-like starting state for 4 strategies can be seen
in the inset of Fig. 7.) The consequences of the random initial
state are plotted by dashed curves while the results of patch-
like starting state are marked by solid lines. The first inter-
esting observation is that the final destination of evolution de-
pends sensitively on the total size of population. For example,
at ǫ ≈ 6.15 both full-E and full-D states are equally likely
for L = 60, but using the same cost the system always arrives
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FIG. 4: (color online) The probability of defector’s extinction when
all 4 strategies are present in the initial state in a patch-like distribu-
tion illustrated in the inset of Fig. 7. The alternative outcome of the
evolution is when strategy E dies out and the system terminates to
the well-known D + P state. Parameters are r = 3.8, β = 0.2, and
γ = 0.01. The system sizes are marked in the legend.
to the full-E state if the system size exceeds L = 200. As
we increase the system size the related curves become steeper
and final outcome becomes less ambiguous. Simultaneously,
the critical cost shifts toward higher values. Interestingly, the
convergence to the large-size limit behavior is much faster if
we apply patch-like initial state to launch the evolution.
This finite-size effect can be explained by the fact that the
emerging size of a cluster containing E-players is strongly
limited by the whole system size. If the latter is too small
then only small E islands can emerge after initial transient
period and their possible growth is determined by the curva-
ture of the interface separating competingE andD strategies.
This effect can be measured systematically if we monitor the
growth of E islands with different sizes in the sea of defec-
tor players. For clarity, the initial state is shown in the inset
of Fig. 3. If we launch the evolution from this state then the
island will grow or shrink depending on the value of ǫ. This
critical ǫ value increases as we decrease the curvature of sep-
arating wall and converges to ǫc = 6.749 in the limit when
strategies compete for space along a straight domain wall.
The latter can only emerge spontaneously if the system size is
large enough, which explains the critical threshold value we
obtained in Fig. 2. To close our discussion about the origin of
finite-size effects we should note that it is always a potential
danger in multi-strategy spatial systems which is frequently
ignored by agent-based simulations. Beside inappropriate ini-
tial states the system size may also limit the largest emerging
characteristic length of patterns, which can also be a source of
misleading conclusions. These problems can only be avoided
by applying systematic finite-size analysis [48–50].
Interestingly, the critical cost value for the two-strategy sys-
tem is significantly smaller than the threshold value (ǫ =
9.442) we obtained in Fig. 1 when all possible strategies were
present during the evolution. The difference of critical cost
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FIG. 5: (color online) Panel (a): The time evolution of the frequen-
cies of competing strategies starting from a random initial state on
square lattice. Parameters are r = 2, β = 0.6, γ = 0.01, ǫ = 2.56,
and L = 6000. The time courses suggest that cooperating strategies
are week alone against defection and they can only survive if they
form an effective alliance. When such an island containing E and P
players emerge then they can sweep out all defectors gradually. To
present the initial evolution clearly logarithmic time scale was used.
Panel (b) illustrates that similar behavior can be observed in random
graph, but the whole evolution is much faster due to short-cut links
between players. Parameter values are r = 1.44, β = 0.7, γ = 0.05,
and ǫ = 0.97 for the latter case where we have N = 106 players.
values highlights that there is a kind of synergy between C
andE strategies and they can sweep out all defectors together,
but strategy E alone would not be able to fight against D ef-
ficiently at such a high cost. This synergy is especially in-
teresting because in general pure cooperators are believed as
”second-order free riders” who do not bear the extra cost of
punishment or exclusion, hence they just utilize the positive
consequence of the latter acts [4, 23]. Our observation sug-
gests that the presence of ”less cooperative” C strategy could
be vital, because without them the largely unselfish excluder
strategy would not function properly. This alliance could be
effective even if strategy E has to bear an unrealistically high
individual cost and may explain why we can find examples of
selfless behavior abound in human societies [51]. As we will
illustrate later the formation of conceptually similar alliance
with punisher strategy is also possible and this effect utilizes
strongly the limited interactions of players provided by struc-
tured population.
B. Behaviors in the high r – low γ region
In the following we turn back to the four-strategy model
and focus on the second conceptually different parameter re-
gion where the synergy factor is still high enough to ensure
coexistence with defectors but the cost of punishment is small
enough to reveal the advantage of P strategy. To illustrate the
typical behavior in this region we chose the representative pa-
rameter values r = 3.8, β = 0.2, and γ = 0.01, where in the
absence of exclusion P players would crowed out C players.
In the absence of the latter strategy punisher players can con-
trol defector more efficiently, which provides a significantly
higher cooperation level comparing to theC+D solution [33].
Interestingly, here the outcomes of evolution is conceptually
similar to the behavior we observed for the two-strategyD−E
model. Namely, eitherD or E players die out during the evo-
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FIG. 6: (color online) Spatial pattern formation explains the evolutionary advantage of alliance with excluder strategy. Every row illustrates
different evolutionary trajectory depending on which strategies are present at the beginning. In panels (a) to (f) only green C (light grey) and
black P strategies fight against red (middle grey) defectors. In panels (g) to (l) only C and blue (dark grey) E strategies compete with D
players for space. In both mentioned cases defection prevails because neither punishment nor exclusion alone is able to compete efficiently
against defection. However, when they both P and E are present, shown in panels (m) to (r), then they can form a powerful alliance which can
crowed out defectors. Parameters are r = 2, β = 0.6, γ = 0.01, ǫ = 2.4, and L = 100 for all three cases. Note that the triumph of defection
is very fast, takes only 100MCSs for the first two rows, but the spread of P +E alliance is relatively slow and 4000MCSs needed to reach
a defector-free state.
lution and the final destination is highly ambiguous especially
at small system sizes. Our results are summarized in Fig. 4
where we plotted the probability of defector’s extinction in
dependence of cost of exclusion. As we already noted, if de-
fectors die out all other strategies become equivalent because
neither P nor E have to bear any additional cost anymore. In
the alternative case of evolution E dies out first, after C, who
is not as efficient against D as P strategy, and finally D and
P coexist in the stationary state similar to the behavior we ob-
served for the simplified three-strategy (D,C, P ) model [33].
The serious finite-size dependence of the final outcome has
similar origin as we observed for the simplifiedD−E model.
Namely, if the system size is too small then it is unlikely that
the sufficiently large island of cooperator strategies emerge
during the initial transient, which will keep defectors alive.
Figure 4 suggests that the defector-free state is very likely
even at very high cost of exclusion. Note that the threshold
value in the large size limit is almost 2 times higher than the
ǫc = 6.749 value we obtained whenE fighted againstD alone
at this value of synergy factor. Bearing almost double high
cost of exclusion seems impossible at first glance, but here
the individual viability of strategy E is based on its common
success with punishing strategy.
To emphasize the general importance of the alliance of ex-
cluders with other cooperator strategies we monitor how frac-
tions of strategies change in time when the system is started
from a random initial state. Initially, when defectors are dis-
tributed randomly, cooperator strategies are unable to fight ef-
ficiently against defectors. This effect is specially remarkable
at small r values when network reciprocity alone cannot pro-
vide proper help for cooperators. As a consequence, almost all
cooperative players die out, but just a little portion of E and
P players survive who could form the necessary large island.
When this alliance emerges then it can beat defectors who will
die out eventually. It is worth stressing that this effect does not
limited to lattice topology but can also be observed when in-
teraction graph is random. This is illustrated in the right panel
of Fig. 5, where a random regular graph is used in which play-
ers have still k = 4 nearest neighbors but their connections are
rewired randomly [52]. In the latter case defectors start grow-
ing first but their victor is just temporary because the emerging
alliance of P and E strategies will crowed out allD players.
In the next plot we present some characteristic snapshots
of pattern formation which illustrate how alliance with ex-
cluder players works. For comparison we also plotted evolu-
tions which were taken at identical parameter values but one
of the aliance members was missing. In the first row of Fig. 6
C and P players try to compete against defectors. In agree-
ment with previous observation for the simplified (D,C, P )
model their fight is fruitless because the very low value of r
and the moderate value of fine β prevent them to survive and
the system will terminate into a full defection state. In the
middle row of Fig. 6 C and E strategies fight against D, but
they loose again: the value of synergy factor is really small,
while the cost of exclusion is significant. Finally, in the last
rowwe allow all cooperator strategies to be present simultane-
6ously. As in the previous casesC dies out very soon due to the
small value of r, but some survivingP andE players can form
a viable alliance and their mixture can gradually crowed out
defectors. It is important to stress that the mixture of these co-
operative strategies is necessary to beat D. Otherwise, when
they fight individually, defectors revive. This temporary suc-
cess of defectors can be observed between panels (p) and (q),
where some surviving defectors enter a relatively large homo-
geneous island of punisher strategies. As a results, a compact
D spot starts growing immediately and its propagation is only
blocked when its frontier meets with the mixture of P and
E players again. After the mixed P + E formation becomes
successful and eliminates all defectors.
The above described pattern formation gives a deeper in-
sight why the alliance with excluder strategy can be success-
ful against defection even if both members of the alliance is
weaker thanD players. When a defector is neighboringwith a
punisher then the latter could be weak, but the presence of an
excluder in the group makes P player successful, because E
provides the necessary information to exclude the exploiter.
Interestingly, if D is neighboring an excluder then the latter
can be weaker due the extremely large exclusion cost which
involves the extinction of E. Therefore, it is always P (or C
if r is large enough, as in the case discussed regarding Fig. 1)
is the one who beatsD, but the success of the fighter is always
based on the support of excluder who is just behind the fighter
and provides a competitive payoff for cooperator mates within
the group. It is important to stress that similar mechanism can-
not be observed in a well-mixed system which is modeled by
a mean-field theory. In the latter approach the ”hiding” of a
vulnerable E player from a direct invasion of a defector is
not possible because all group members can be reached with
equal probabilities within the group. Consequently, the viabil-
ity of an E strategy is strongly limited by the individual cost
ǫ. In a spatial system, however, the range of strategy interac-
tion is limited which offers a slight symmetry breaking and
the chance of P (or C at certain conditions) beatsD is higher
than the frequency thatD beatsE. This is why strategyE can
survive for the benefit of the whole community even if such
player has to bear an enormously high individual cost.
C. Behaviors in the low r region
We close the Results section by presenting representative
solutions in the third previously mentioned parameter region
where the simplified model predicts qualitatively different be-
havior [33]. Here network reciprocity alone is unable to main-
tain pure cooperation due to the very small synergy factor. As
previous studies emphasized, in this case only a very strong
punishment can help and when it is fulfilled then the sys-
tem will terminate into a completelyD-free state. Otherwise,
when the fine is not strong enough, the full-D final destination
is inevitable even in the presence of P strategy. The β − γ
dependence of critical fine is illustrated in Ref. [26]. In the
present case, when we add strategy E, the possible solutions
are very similar, but strategy E takes the decisive role of P .
Namely either D prevails or dies out and leaving a neutral
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FIG. 7: (color online) The probability of defector strategy dying out
when all 4 strategies are present in the initial state in a patch-like
distribution. An example of this kind of starting state is shown in
the inset where colors (different range of shades of gray in printed
version) mark homogeneous spots of competing strategies. The al-
ternative destination of evolution is the full-D state. System sizes are
marked in the legend. Parameters are r = 2, β = 0.6, and γ = 0.01.
Results were averaged over 5000 independent runs for small sizes
while data for the largest size were averaged over 200 runs.
drift among the remaining strategies. But the coexistence of
D with other strategies is not possible. More specifically, if
the cost of exclusion is low then defection will be eliminated
leaving other cooperator strategies alive. Otherwise, when the
cost ǫ is high, defectors will prevail and all other strategies
die out. As for higher r value, here we can also observe a se-
rious finite-size effect around the threshold value of ǫ which
has similar origin as explained above. As Figure 7 illustrates,
both mentioned destinations are possible in a wide interval of
ǫ when the system is not large enough and the solution be-
comes unambiguous only in the large size limit.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is our everyday life experience that some members of hu-
man societies take extra effort for the community [53, 54].
From evolutionary viewpoint these group members should be
unsuccessful individually and their sacrifice cannot be main-
tained in the long term. A particular example for such selfless
behavior could be an exclusion strategy when a player invests
efforts into not only detect defection but also alarms group
members about the possible danger. Needless to say, the latter
players utilize happily this information and can avoid being
exploited by D players. This phenomenon was already stud-
ied from evolutionary aspect in well-mixed populations and
it was found that the viability of social exclusion is strongly
limited by its additional cost ǫ [29–32].
The goal of present work was to explore what specific out-
comes may be found in structured populations which model
the limited number of our interactions more realistically. The
first different behavior we can observe in a spatial system is
7the stable coexistence of defectors and exclusion strategy at
specific parameter values, but this solution also requires the
presence of pure cooperators. Otherwise, when only defec-
tors meet excluders then only one of them survive, which de-
pends sensitively on the cost of exclusion and the synergy fac-
tor r. Interestingly, the final outcome is rather ambiguous in
a broad cost interval around the threshold value of ǫ and be-
comes determined only in the large-size limit. This is a rather
unusual behavior in spatial systems where the final destina-
tion of evolution is robust and remains largely independent of
the initial state even at relatively small system sizes. This be-
havior can be explained by the fact that the final outcome de-
pends sensitively on whether a critical size of homogeneous
excluder domain may emerge, which is a vital condition for
their triumph. Evidently, if the system size is too small then
the requested domain cannot emerge which leads to a mis-
leading prediction of evolutionary outcome. To clarify this
curvature-dependent growth we have made a systematic study
and demonstrated that the limit threshold value of exclusion
cost obtained from this specific setup agrees with the predic-
tion of large size limit. This analysis revealed that a specific
initial state, where competing strategies already form homo-
geneous clusters could be more efficient to converge faster to-
ward the large size limit solution.
Our most surprising observation was to reveal that exclu-
sion can be viable and useful to the community even if E
excluder strategy has to bear an enormously high individual
cost. Such a huge sacrifice would be pointless in a well-mixed
population because it would involve the fast extinction of E
strategy and the system evolves to an exclusion-free state. In
structured populations, however, we can observe the opposite
trajectory because defection can be swept out for very high
exclusion cost. This behavior is based on a mechanism where
exclusion forms an effective defense alliance with other co-
operator strategies who do not have to bear the mentioned
high cost. When this alliance works then the latter strategy
can beat defectors because the simultaneous presence of ex-
cluder in the group helps them to avoid being exploited. As
we argued, an excluder would be vulnerable when she meets
directly with a defector, but this unfortunate meeting happens
less frequently than the interaction of D and P (or C) play-
ers. This is a straightforward consequence of limited range
of interactions which is an essential feature of all spatial sys-
tems. The latter also explains why conceptually similar be-
havior may be obtained for other interaction topologies that
was also demonstrated for random graph.
Our main results, which cannot be observed in well-mixed
populations, highlight that individual efforts should not neces-
sarily be harmful if an effective alliance can be formed where
the personal effort is compensated by some protection hence
the seemingly trivial individual failure can be avoided via the
wellbeing of the whole society. This study also depicts that
the viability of an individual strategy should not be evaluated
by pair comparison of competing strategies only because spa-
tial systems always offers the chance of a new formation of
alliances that can only be discussed when the whole system is
on the stage.
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